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PATENT CONTROLS ON GM CROP FARMING 
 
Janice M. Mueller1 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Patents on genetically modified (GM) crop technology arm their 
owners with powerful control over farmers’ ability to grow, harvest, 
distribute, and profit from GM crops.  No clearer example exists than the 
April 2004 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling II),2 in which the court upheld 
Monsanto’s patent licensing practice of forbidding farmers to save seed 
from GM crops for replanting.  McFarling II thus confirms the illegality 
of a custom engaged in by farmers for centuries.3  The Federal Circuit’s 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  E-mail: 
mueller@law.pitt.edu.  I am grateful to the participants in “The Future of Food–Legal 
and Ethical Challenges” conference held at Santa Clara University on April 15, 2005 for 
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
2 See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 2956 (2005) [hereinafter McFarling II] (opinion authored by Circuit Judge Clevenger 
for a panel also including Circuit Judge Lourie and Senior Circuit Judge Plager).  An 
earlier Federal Circuit decision in the same matter upheld a district court’s preliminary 
injunction of McFarling. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter McFarling I]. 
3 The saving and replanting of seed is a custom of ancient lineage.  See Jeremy P. Oczek, 
In the Aftermath of the "Terminator" Technology Controversy: Intellectual Property 
Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 627, 647 (2000) (noting that “[e]ver since humans began the transition from 
nomadic herders to farmers, saving seed for planting the following year's crop has been a 
basic tenet in the practice of agriculture.”) (citing Laurent Belsie, Plants Without Seeds 
Challenge Historic Farming Practices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 1998, at B4).  
This custom is reflected in the exemption for seed-saving included in the U.S. Plant 
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) of 1970.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2005) (providing in part 
that “[e]xcept to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under 
subsections (3) and (4) of section 111 [7 U.S.C.S. § 2541(3) and (4)], it shall not infringe 
any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, 
or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding 
purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the 
person, or for sale as provided in this section.”).     
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conclusion that Monsanto’s restriction on planting saved seed does not 
violate the antitrust laws nor amount to patent misuse deserves further 
scrutiny, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s invitation to the Acting 
Solicitor General to file an amicus brief in McFarling II.4  This paper 
details the facts of McFarling II and critiques the Federal Circuit’s 
analysis of the unique patent and antitrust law issues raised thereby.   
 
II.  Facts of Monsanto v. McFarling 
 
Homan McFarling, a Mississippi soybean farmer, obtained 1000 
bags of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® (RR) soybean seed from his local 
seed store.5  This seed is genetically modified so that the soybean plants 
                                                                                                                         
The 1985 advent of U.S. utility patent protection for seeds and plants provided a 
stronger form of protection than the PVPA that was particularly useful for genetically 
engineered crops.  See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd.Pat.App. & Int. 1985) 
(rejecting USPTO examiner’s position that plants and seeds protectable under the PVPA 
or the Plant Patent Act (PPA) of 1930 could not also qualify as subject matter eligible for 
utility patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101).  In McFarling II, the Federal Circuit 
confirmed that U.S. utility patent protection of seeds is not subject to the seed-saving 
exemption found in the PVPA.  See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1344 (concluding that in 
light of Supreme Court’s interpretation in J.E.M. AG  Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), of Congress’s intent in enacting the PVPA, “Congress 
did not intend to prohibit owners of utility patents from enforcing seed-saving 
prohibitions in their licenses”); see also Mark D. Janis, Supplemental Forms of 
Intellectual Property Protection for Plants, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 305, 311 (2004).   
4 McFarling filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on July 6, 2004.  See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2004 WL 
1535852 (S. Ct. July 6, 2004).  The Supreme Court thereafter invited the Acting Solicitor 
General to file a brief in the case expressing the views of the United States.  McFarling v. 
Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 348 (2004).  The United States recommended denial of 
certiorari, primarily on the ground that the Federal Circuit’s decision “involve[d] a 
narrow application of established legal principles to a specific factual context involving a 
self-replicating product.”  Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10, McFarling v. 
Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2005 WL 1277857 (S. Ct. May 27, 2005).  The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied certiorari.  McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 2956 (2005). 
5 The transaction is arranged such that instead of purchasing the seeds outright, the 
farmer merely obtains a license to use the seeds subject to certain restrictions on that use.  
Software manufacturers similarly use “shrink-wrap” licenses to convey software to users 
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grown therefrom will be resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup® herbicide.6  
Monsanto owns several patents directed to the gene modification 
technology7 and licenses the patents to approximately 200 seed 
manufacturers (denominated Monsanto’s “seed partners”), which insert 
the patented trait (glyphosate resistance) into unmodified soybeans.  As a 
condition of obtaining the resulting GM seed, McFarling had to sign 
Monsanto’s Technology Agreement.  In exchange for the “opportunity to 
purchase and plant seed containing” the RR technology, a farmer signing 
the Technology Agreement agrees inter alia “to not save any crop 
produced from this seed for replanting.”8  Because he cannot save the 
“second-generation” seed and use it for the following season’s planting, 
                                                                                                                         
without “selling” the software to them.  If these transactions involved true sales, the 
exhaustion of rights and/or first sale doctrines would otherwise prohibit the vendor’s 
imposition of post-sale restrictions.       
6 Currently, 60% of all soybeans grown are transgenic.  Herbicide tolerant soybeans are 
the most dominant of all biotech crops, accounting for 48.4 million hectares worldwide.  
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Dominant Biotech 
Crops, 2004 (chart), 
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/press_release/briefs32/figures/dominant_crops.jpg 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
7 Two patents directed to various aspects of the RR seed technology are at issue in 
McFarling II.  Monsanto’s U.S. Pat. No. 5,633,435 (‘435 patent) relates to the gene 
encoding a modified form of the enzyme 5-enolpyruvyl-shikimate-3-phosphate synthase 
(EPSPS).  Naturally-occurring, unmodified EPSPS is inhibited by glyphosate, the active 
ingredient in Roundup® herbicide.  The modified form of EPSPS is not affected by the 
presence of glyphosate, and performs the same sugar-conversion function, necessary for 
plant growth, that is carried out by naturally occurring EPSPS.  The ‘435 patent claims 
the isolated DNA molecule encoding the modified EPSPS; a glyphosate-tolerant plant 
cell comprising that DNA molecule; a glyphosate- tolerant plant comprising that plant 
cell; a seed of a glyphosate-tolerant plant; a particular transgenic soybean plant; and a 
method of producing genetically transformed plants which are tolerant toward glyphosate 
herbicide.  See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1338-39.   
Monsanto’s U.S. Pat. No. 5,352,605 (‘605 patent) relates to the use of a 
particular promoter in genetically modified plant cells.  The ‘605 patent claims inter alia 
DNA sequences and plant cells containing the promoter (a promoter sequence is a DNA 
sequence located in proximity to the DNA sequence that encodes a protein and that, in 
part, tells the cellular machinery how much of the protein to make).  Id.    
8 McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339. 
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the farmer must purchase new “first-generation” RR seed for planting each 
season (so long as he wants to continue growing RR soybeans).      
Contrary to the terms of the Technology Agreement, during two 
successive growing seasons McFarling saved the second-generation seed 
from his soybean crop and replanted it.  This generated new soybean 
plants having the patented genetic makeup and herbicide resistance.9  
Monsanto sued McFarling, alleging that in saving and replanting he had 
infringed Monsanto’s ‘435 and ‘605 patents and had breached the 
Technology Agreement.  Siding with Monsanto, a federal district court  
granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, imposed 
liquidated damages on McFarling in the amount of $780,000, and rejected 
McFarling’s counterclaims and defenses that the Technology Agreement 
provisions violated the antitrust laws and constituted patent misuse by 
Monsanto.       
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, McFarling argued that the 
Technology Agreement’s prohibition on saving and replanting seeds was a 
form of illegal tying,10 which constituted both a violation of the antitrust 
laws11 and patent misuse.12  McFarling took the position that illegal tying 
                                                 
9 Cf. id. at 1343 (noting that first- and second-generation seeds “are nearly identical 
copies”). 
10 A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product . . . on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that 
he will not purchase that [tied] product from any other supplier.”  See Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992).  The “essential characteristic 
of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying 
product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not 
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.  When such 
‘forcing’ is present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained 
and the Sherman Act is violated.”  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 
2, 12 (1984).  
11 Section One of the Sherman Act declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  The courts have construed 
 4 
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occurred when Monsanto required that farmers purchase new RR seed (the 
“tied” product) as a condition of obtaining a license under the Monsanto 
patents to “use” the patented technology (i.e., the Roundup® herbicide 
resistance trait) in growing their soybean crop.  In other words, by 
asserting its patent-based dominance in the market for the patented genetic 
modification, Monsanto was improperly dampening competition in the 
market for the seed.  
McFarling urged that Monsanto could have chosen a less 
restrictive alternative to the tying arrangement.  This alternative would 
have allowed farmers to save the second-generation seed and replant it, so 
long as the farmers paid Monsanto the appropriate technology fee for the 
amount of seed saved each season.  Instead, Monsanto’s Technology 
Agreement forced the farmers  to buy new RR seed each season, which 
(according to McFarling) was much more expensive than replanting and 
resulted in subsidizing the seed companies. 
The Federal Circuit rejected McFarling’s tying theory.  McFarling 
had not raised a “typical” tying allegation, in which a patentee conditions 
the grant of a patent license on a licensee’s purchase of an unpatented 
material for use in the invention; in this case the second-generation RR 
seed was also the subject of the licensed Monsanto patents.13  According 
to the Federal Circuit, McFarling’s proposed less restrictive alternative of 
saving/replanting the second-generation seed and paying a commensurate 
                                                                                                                         
§ 1 as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of trade, rather than interpreting the 
statutory language in its fullest, literal extent.   
12 The Federal Circuit observed that in determining whether a patentee has committed 
patent misuse, “the key inquiry is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force 
from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant 
with anticompetitive effect.”  McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1341. 
13 Id. at 1342. 
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technology fee would amount to granting him a compulsory license to use 
the patent rights in conjunction with the second-generation seed.14  
Reaffirming its earlier broad pronouncements concerning a patent owner’s 
right to refuse to license patented material,15 the Federal Circuit “declined 
to hold that Monsanto’s raw exercise of its right to exclude from the 
patented invention by itself is a ‘tying’ arrangement that exceeds the scope 
of the patent grant.”16 
While rejecting McFarling’s tying theory, the Federal Circuit also 
took issue with certain of Monsanto’s characterizations of its licensing 
practices.  Monsanto had urged that its prohibition on saving and 
replanting the second-generation seed was a permissible “field of use” 
restriction on the patented first-generation seed.17  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed, explaining that Monsanto’s Technology Agreement did not 
impose a restriction on the use of the product purchased under the license 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to 
inquire into patentee’s “subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even 
though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive 
effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory 
patent grant.”). 
16 McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1342. 
17 A typical field of use restriction in a patent license is a restraint on the licensee’s 
freedom to use the patented technology for particular purposes.  For example, a license 
for technology to produce a GM crop might limit the licensee to use of the patented 
technology in the growing of a particular crop, such as soybeans or corn.  Territorial 
(geographic) restrictions on a licensee’s use of a patented invention are also frequently 
encountered.  Generally, so long as the field of use and territorial restrictions appear in a 
vertical licensing arrangement (where the patent owner and licensee are not competitors), 
and where the licensee is not prohibited from using alternative noninfringing technology 
or developing its own noninfringing technology, the restrictions will not be deemed 
anticompetitive restraints of trade.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.3 (1995) 
[hereinafter Licensing Guidelines], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
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(i.e., the first-generation seed), as would a conventional field of use 
restriction, but rather imposed a restriction on the use of the goods made 
by the licensed product (i.e., the second-generation seed).  The Federal 
Circuit admitted that the propriety of such a restraint in a patent license 
was an open question, for its case law had “not addressed in general terms 
the status of such restrictions placed on goods made by, yet not 
incorporating, the licensed good under the patent misuse doctrine.”18 
Monsanto’s licensing restriction was saved in the Federal Circuit’s 
view, however, by the unique facts of this case; namely, that the licensed 
and patented product (the first-generation seed) and the goods made by the 
licensed product (the second-generation seed) were “nearly identical 
copies” that were both within the literal scope of Monsanto’s ‘435 patent.  
According to the Federal Circuit, this unique circumstance meant that the 
licensing restrictions on the use of goods produced by the licensed product 
were not beyond the scope of the patent grant at issue.19  Therefore, patent 
misuse was not established.   
Having dismissed McFarling’s patent misuse defense, the Federal 
Circuit quickly rejected his antitrust counterclaim.   “[B]ecause we have 
found McFarling’s allegations insufficient to present a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether Monsanto’s licensing restrictions went 
beyond the boundaries of its patent grant, McFarling’s antitrust 
counterclaim also fails.”20  In this case, the Federal Circuit concluded, “the 
anticompetitive effect of which McFarling complains is part and parcel of 
the patent system’s role in creating incentives for potential inventors.”21   
                                                 
18 McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1343. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
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To establish illegal tying under the antitrust laws, the claimant 
must establish that the tying and tied products are in fact separate 
products.22  The Federal Circuit agreed with McFarling that the district 
court had erred by failing to consider consumer demand in the course of 
concluding that the tying product (the patented trait) and the tied product 
(the seed) were not two separate markets.  However, the Federal Circuit 
observed, “the district court’s finding concerning the unified nature of the 
market for the trait and the seed is not relevant to our holding, so we 
expressly decline to reach or review it.”23 
Although it sustained McFarling’s liability for breach of the 
Technology Agreement, the Federal Circuit did vacate the district court’s 
award of $780,000 in damages to Monsanto.24  The liquidated damages 
clause in the Technology Agreement was invalid and unenforceable under 
Missouri law as applied to McFarling’s breach of replanting of saved seed.  
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court for 
determination of actual damages.          
 
III.  McFarling’s Petition for Certiorari 
 
McFarling filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court 
on July 6, 2004.25  The Questions Presented were as follows: 
 
                                                 
22 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) (explaining that 
“a tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been 
linked.”). 
23 McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1344. 
24 Id. at 1344-52. 
25 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 2004 WL 
1535852 (S. Ct. July 6, 2004). 
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1. May a patent holder lawfully prohibit 
farmers from saving and replanting seed as a 
condition to the purchase of patented 
technology? 
 
2. Does obtaining patents on products which 
are the subject of licensing agreements 
afford an absolute defense to any claim that 
the licensing agreements violate the 
Sherman Act?26 
 
McFarling’s arguments for grant of certiorari focused largely on 
the economic impact of Monsanto’s licensing practices, which McFarling 
asserted the Federal Circuit had erroneously failed to consider:  
 
The heart of McFarling's argument is that 
agreements to prohibit seed-saving are an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, since the 
farmer is not allowed to purchase the 
Monsanto technology without also agreeing 
to buy overpriced new seed. Monsanto ties 
unwanted new seed to the right to purchase 
the patented technology.  This tying is not 
for the benefit only of Monsanto.  Instead, 
its seed company licensees derive a financial 
windfall since farmers have to buy 
overpriced new seed from the seed 
companies each year.  A farmer cannot 
purchase the technology unless he also 
agrees to purchase new seed each year.27 
 
Disputing the Federal Circuit’s statement that the anticompetitive 
effect of Monsanto’s policy was “part and parcel of the patent system’s 
role in creating incentives for potential inventors,” McFarling contended 
                                                 
26 Id. at *1. 
27 Id. at *9. 
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that the beneficiaries of Monsanto’s licensing scheme were not primarily 
Monsanto but rather the seed companies, which did not invent the patented 
technology.  McFarling cited record evidence that when a U.S. soybean 
farmer purchases a 50-pound bag of RR seed, he is paying not only a 
$6.50 technology fee (patent royalty) to Monsanto but also an additional 
$18.00 to the seed company for the seed germplasm.  In contrast, a farmer 
who saves and replants the second-generation seed will have invested only 
about $7.00 per bag of seed.28  According to McFarling, the Technology 
Agreement ensured that “the purchase of new seed is ‘bundled’ with the 
technology as a way to extract monopoly profits from farmers, who would 
otherwise simply pay the technology fee to Monsanto and use saved 
seeds.”  Moreover, “farmers consider saved seed to be superior in quality” 
over new purchased seed.”29   
McFarling’s certiorari petition also challenged the validity of 
Monsanto’s patents, charging the Federal Circuit with “radically 
extend[ing] the previous reach of the patent laws as this Court has defined 
them.”  McFarling noted that Monsanto’s ‘435 patent claimed both the 
genetically-altered seed and its progeny; that is, both the first- and second-
generation seed.  According to McFarling, the “second generation of 
genetically-altered soybeans is not a ‘human-made’ invention,” as 
required by the Court’s decisions such as Diamond v. Chakrabarty,30 but 
rather is a product of nature “created by God.”31     
                                                 
28 Id. at *5. 
29 Id. at *7. 
30 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“the relevant distinction [i]s 
not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living 
or not, and human-made inventions.”). 
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McFarling, No. 04-31, 2004 WL 1535852, at *13-
*14. 
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In an order issued October 12, 2004, the Supreme Court invited the 
Acting Solicitor General to file a brief in the case expressing the views of 
the United States.32  The government recommended denial of certiorari, 
primarily on the ground that the Federal Circuit’s decision did not merit 
review because it “involve[d] a narrow application of established legal 
principles to a specific factual context involving a self-replicating 
product.”33  The government admitted that McFarling’s initial pleadings 
had appeared to raise a “novel question” concerning whether the patent 
exhaustion doctrine34 limited Monsanto’s ability to enforce post-sale 
restrictions on the use of its patented seed,35 but contended that McFarling 
had failed to properly preserve that issue for review by the Supreme 
                                                 
32 McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 348 (2004). 
33 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 04-31, 
2005 WL 1277857 (S. Ct. May 27, 2005).  The determinative inquiry for patent misuse is 
whether a patentee’s challenged practice has “’impermissibly broadened the scope of the 
patent grant.’”  Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)).  Here, both the first-generation seed sold by Monsanto and its partners and 
the second-generation seed produced by the first-generation seed were within the scope 
of the Monsanto patents in suit, and thus patent misuse was not made out.  See id. 
 
34 The patent exhaustion doctrine provides that “sale of [a patented product] exhausts the 
monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, 
control the use or disposition of the article.”  United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 
241, 250 (1942). 
 
35 See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 11, McFarling, No. 04-31, 2005 WL 
1277857 (observing that Federal Circuit’s earlier rejection of McFarling’s patent 
exhaustion defense at preliminary injunction stage involved “the novel question whether 
(and, if so, to what extent) the patent-exhaustion doctrine applies to restrictions on the use 
of a materially identical patented product that was produced by the patented product sold 
by the patentee.”).  In the government’s view, such a question “may not recur with any 
frequency, and it would be beneficial to have a fully considered resolution of that 
question in the lower courts.”  Id.  
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Court.36  The Supreme Court followed the government’s recommendation 
and denied certiorari on June 27, 2005.37 
 
IV.   Discussion 
 
Those who oppose the farming of GM crops may applaud the 
result, if not the reasoning, of the Federal Circuit’s decision in McFarling 
II.  Allowing Monsanto to prohibit the saving and replanting of second-
generation seed and forcing farmers to buy new GM seed each season may 
limit the amount of GM crop grown; farmers will simply not be able to 
afford to grow as much as if they were permitted to save seed.  Whether 
Monsanto’s practices actually have a chilling effect on the planting of GM 
crops is questionable, however, in light of the fact that 75% of the 
soybeans grown in the U.S. today are genetically modified.38  The 
practical result of Monsanto’s licensing practices may disproportionately 
impact small farmers, concentrating GM crop growth among larger 
farming operations which are better able to bear the financial burden.   
In this regard McFarling’s challenge to Monsanto’s licensing 
practices resonates well beyond the U.S. and other industrialized 
economies that dominate agribusiness.  Despite McFarling’s protest, the 
added financial burden of having to buy new seed each season is not a 
novel problem in the U.S., where many farmers have done so since the 
                                                 
36 See id. 
 
37 McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 125 S. Ct. 2956 (2005).  Another reason why certiorari 
was denied in McFarling II may be that review was recently granted in another 
patent/antitrust case discussed infra Part IV, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005).  It is relatively rare for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari 
in patent cases and even more unlikely that the Court would accept two patent cases 
involving antitrust issues for review at the same time.  
38 See PETER PRINGLE, FOOD, INC.: MENDEL TO MONSANTO–THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF 
THE BIOTECH HARVEST 189 (2003) (stating that by 2003, in America 75% of the soybean 
crop was GM). 
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introduction of hybrid varieties in the 1920s and 1930s.39  The longer-term 
and potentially much more onerous impact of seed-saving prohibitions is 
seen by comparing the plight of subsistence farmers in developing 
countries.  In these countries, about 80 percent of farmers save seed for 
replanting in order to reduce costs.40  It is unclear how or when developing 
country farmers will share in the promise of GM crops.  As concluded by 
the 2004 annual report of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the real problem with GM crops is not safety, but 
rather access to the benefits of the technology.41  Research and 
development into GM crops has not yet been sufficiently aimed at helping 
establish food security in the poorest countries of the world.  The poor 
have been left at the sidelines of the “gene revolution,” and seed-saving 
prohibitions contribute to their exclusion.    
The Federal Circuit in McFarling II rejected as tantamount to 
compulsory licensing McFarling’s proposal for a “less restrictive 
alternative,” that farmers should be allowed to save seed and replant it 
while paying a technology fee to Monsanto for the amount of seed 
                                                 
39 See FELICIA WU & WILLIAM P. BUTZ, THE FUTURE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: 
LESSONS FROM THE GREEN REVOLUTION 52 (Rand Corp. 2004); id. at 50 (noting that 
hybrid corn was first grown on U.S. farms in the 1920s and 1930s).  “[B]y its nature, 
hybrid seed precludes farmers from saving their own seed for planting. . . . [I]f a farmer 
achieves good results with hybrid XYZ, and wants to grow more of the same hybrid the 
following year, he must again obtain hybrid seed produced by the controlled crossing of 
the same two or more parental lines used to produce the hybrid in prior years. . . .  Only 
those who control the parent lines from which a hybrid is made can reproduce it.”  
William L. Brown, Plant Genetic Resources: A View from the Seed Industry, in SEEDS 
AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 218, 224 
(Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., ed., Duke Univ. Press 1988).   
40 See WU & BUTZ, supra note 39, at 52. 
41 Editorial, A Call for a Gene Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A26. 
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saved.42  The court likely viewed the proposal as one that would 
effectively compel Monsanto to give the farmers permission to “use” the 
patented trait in raising a new crop, rather than allowing Monsanto to 
exercise its statutory right to exclude others from that use.43  From a patent 
law perspective, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of McFarling’s proposal is 
not surprising.  United States courts have historically disfavored 
compulsory licensing and any remedy considered tantamount thereto.44   
However, the Federal Circuit did not address the antitrust 
consequences of the existence of less restrictive alternatives.  Restraints in 
patent licenses between parties in a vertical arrangement (such as 
Monsanto and McFarling) are generally analyzed under the antitrust rule 
of reason,45 which considers not just anticompetitive effect but also the 
antitrust defendant’s pro-competitive justifications for the restraint.  For an 
apparently anticompetitive restraint to be redeemed, it must not only 
promote a legitimate objective (as in this case, maintaining incentives for 
innovation through recouping of R&D investment), but must also do so 
significantly better than the less restrictive alternatives.46  As McFarling’s 
                                                 
42 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 2956 (2005). 
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005). 
44  E.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (describing 
compulsory licensing as "rarity" in U.S. patent system); see also EDITH TILTON PENROSE, 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 172 (1951) (explaining that 
compulsory licensing has been “violently opposed” in the U.S. because it “can be such a 
serious derogation of the monopoly ‘rights’ of the patentee”); Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
911 (1990) (describing compulsory licensing as “anathema” to U.S. patent law).  The 
U.S. Congress considered but ultimately dropped the idea of compulsory licensing as part 
of the 1952 Patent Act.  See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 215 n.21. 
45 See Licensing Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 3.4.  
46 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505 (2002).  See also Licensing 
Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 4.2 (stating that “[t]he existence of practical and 
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certiorari petition points out, Monsanto has in fact exercised less 
restrictive alternatives outside the U.S. market.  In Argentina, Monsanto 
permits soybean farmers to save and replant patented varieties upon 
payment of an annual fee.47  Among the 17 countries that now permit the 
growing of GM crops, Argentina is second only to the U.S. in terms of 
acreage.48   
Is Monsanto’s seed saving prohibition a legitimate field of use 
restriction on its patented GM technology?  The Federal Circuit’s decision 
strongly suggests that absent the unique fact that the progeny of the 
patented seed is genetically identical and thus also within the ‘435 patent’s 
scope, Monsanto’s field of use restriction would not pass antitrust muster.  
The court left unresolved the question of whether a patent licensor may 
properly impose license restrictions on goods made by,  yet not 
incorporating, the licensed good, limiting its decision to the unique facts 
                                                                                                                         
significantly less restrictive alternatives is relevant to a determination of whether a 
restraint is reasonably necessary.”). 
47 Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 652 n.244 (2004) (citing David Dechant, 
Monsanto Wants Extended Seed Royalties, CROPCHOICE, May 22, 2003, available at 
http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/Monsanto-Seed-Royalties22may03.htm).  Dechant’s 
article translates a Monsanto Argentina website as providing the following terms to 
farmers: “Following the purchase of the seed and before the next crop year begins, the 
producer needs to make a sworn statement attesting to the amount of seed saved for 
planting. After turning over the sworn statement, Monsanto will emit a debit note for 
royalties of the value of US $1.50 for every 25 kilos (55 pounds) of seed. This 
mechanism will repeat itself every time the farmer saves seed bought under this system.”  
Id.   
48 See International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Global 
Status of Biotech Crops in 2004 (chart), 
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/press_release/briefs32/figures/Biotech_map_acreage.
jpg (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) (reporting that in 2004 the U.S. had 117.6 million acres 
of biotech crops while Argentina had 40 million acres; Canada, Brazil, and China round 
out the top five countries in terms of biotech crop acreage).   
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of McFarling II.49  But given the rapid advances in agricultural 
biotechnology, such a scenario is not unlikely to come before the court in 
the future.  Consider a hypothetical genetic modification of a crop that 
would result in the production of second-generation seeds sufficiently 
different in genetic makeup that the patent on the first-generation seed 
does not read on them.   
Expanding the hypothetical beyond the GM crop sector, consider a 
patent on a transgenic mouse that may potentially serve as an important 
laboratory research tool in the development of a new drug for treating 
cancer.  A license granted to permit use of the patented mouse might 
properly restrict the licensee’s use of the mouse to solely research 
applications, or alternatively to commercial-only applications.  But what if 
the license further imposed restrictions on the use of any new drug product 
developed through testing with the mouse?  Consider a hypothetical patent 
license that included a provision barring the use of any resulting new drug 
for diseases other than cancer, or one that limited the nationality of the 
patients that could receive the drug, or that imposed geographic 
restrictions on the distribution of the drug.  Such restrictions would seem 
clearly beyond the scope of the patent on the transgenic mouse and 
presumably would be treated by the courts as an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of the antitrust laws.50  Should the unique fact of 
                                                 
49 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 2956 (2005) (stating that “[o]ur case law has not addressed in general terms the status 
of such restrictions placed on goods made by, yet not incorporating, the licensed good 
under the patent misuse doctrine. . . . [b]ecause the ‘435 patent would read on all 
generations of soybeans produced, we hold that the restrictions in the Technology 
Agreement prohibiting the replanting of the second generation of ROUNDUP READY® 
soybeans do not extend Monsanto’s rights under the patent statute.”).   
50 These seemingly anticompetitive restrictions on the use of a product made by the 
patented invention should be distinguished from a patentee’s ability to recover royalties 
based on the commercial value of that product.  Many patent licenses in the life sciences 
impose “reach-through” royalties.  The propriety of such royalties is the subject of 
 16 
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genetically identical progeny in McFarling II justify more favorable 
treatment?     
Although it was not clearly preserved on appeal,51 McFarling’s 
additional argument that Monsanto’s patents cover “products of nature” 
not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 also raises interesting questions.  
The argument parallels a position recently adopted by Federal Circuit 
Judge Gajarsa in his concurrence in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp.52  In that case, the patent claim at issue broadly recited “crystalline 
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.”  A structurally similar compound, 
paroxetine anhydrate, which was not the subject of any patents, had a 
tendency to spontaneously transform itself into the patented paroxetine 
hemihydrate, without the intent of the accused infringer (a manufacturer of 
the unpatented paroxetine anhydrate).  Rejecting the notion of “inevitable 
infringement” liability, Judge Gajarsa  took the position that “patent 
claims drawn broadly enough to encompass products that spread, appear, 
and ‘reproduce’ through natural processes cover subject matter  not 
patentable under Section 101--and are therefore invalid.”53  In future cases 
of this sort, Judge Gajarsa suggested, “[i]inventors wishing to claim 
                                                                                                                         
ongoing debate and has not yet been squarely addressed by the Federal Circuit.  Cf. 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 02-1052, 02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27796, at *31 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003) (noting that “[w]hile this court does not opine on 
the applicability of a reach-through royalty in this case, the presence or absence of 
stacking royalties for research tools may color the character of a hypothetical negotiation 
between Merck and Integra for access to the RGD peptide technology.”).  
51 The Federal Circuit’s decision noted that McFarling had not challenged the validity of 
Monsanto’s patents at the trial court level.  See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1340 (noting 
that McFarling “failed to raise or argue the alleged invalidity of the ‘435 patent as a 
defense to the breach of the Technology Agreement claim or as an element of its patent 
misuse defense, and at this stage of the proceedings we deem the argument to have been 
waived for purposes of deciding this appeal.”).   
52 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
53 Id. at 1331 (Gajarasa, J., concurring). 
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products that can either be synthesized in laboratories or generated by 
natural processes may protect themselves by incorporating negative 
limitation terms like ‘non-natural’ or ‘non-human’ into the claims that 
they submit for examination.”  
Monsanto’s ‘435 patent claims do not contain such limitations.54  
If the Supreme Court were to view the patent claims to second-generation 
seed as encompassing subject matter that is not patentable, this would 
transform McFarling’s tying claim into a “conventional” one, by which 
the patentee is forcing a licensee to purchase unpatented material as a 
condition for receiving the license.  The Supreme Court has recently 
shown a rather unexpected interest in the limits of patentable subject 
matter,55 which may have contributed to the Court’s initial interest in 
McFarling II.56 
                                                 
54 See U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435, claim 79 (filed Sept. 13, 1994) (“A seed of a 
glyphosate-tolerant plant of claim 28"). 
55 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 1413, 1413 (2005) 
(Order inviting the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the 
United States limited to following question: 
 
Respondent's patent claims a method for detecting a 
form of vitamin B deficiency, which focuses upon a 
correlation in the human body between elevated 
levels of certain amino acids and deficient levels of 
vitamin B.  The method consists of the following: 
First, measure the level of the relevant amino acids 
using any device, whether the device is, or is not, 
patented;  second, notice whether the amino acid 
level is elevated and, if so, conclude that a vitamin B 
deficiency exists.  Is the patent invalid because one 
cannot patent “laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas”?  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed.2d 155 (1981)).   
56 A similar argument of non-patentability was raised, without success, by Canadian 
farmer Perry Schmeiser in his battle with Monsanto over the right to save and replant RR 
canola seeds.  The Canadian Supreme Court upheld the patentability of Monsanto’s 
Canadian patent claims directed to genes conferring herbicide resistance and plant cells 
transformed with such genes.  See Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 Can. Sup. Ct. 
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Lastly, with respect to McFarling’s tying claim, recent changes in 
the Federal Circuit’s law on patent tying may also make that claim more 
feasible.  The Federal Circuit decided McFarling II several months prior 
to its ruling in Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tools Works, Inc.57  The 
court held in Independent Ink that in the patent tying context, a patent 
owner is presumed to have market power and the burden of rebutting this 
presumption is placed on the patentee.  Although the Federal Circuit’s 
holding in Independent Ink is contrary to modern economic thought58 and 
has resulted in a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,59 as long as the 
decision stands it makes the challenge to a tying arrangement before the 
Federal Circuit substantially easier.  In McFarling II, however, the Federal 
Circuit never reached the issue of whether Monsanto had power in the 
relevant market for its patented inventions; rather, it rejected McFarling’s 
threshold argument that the Technology Agreement’s seed saving and 
replanting prohibition constituted a tying arrangement.     
 
                                                                                                                         
LEXIS 32, at *26-*27 (2004).  The Schmeiser majority interpreted the claims as 
encompassing practice of the patented invention in plants regenerated from the patented 
cells, whether the plants were located inside a laboratory or in the field, id. at *27, and 
rejected the dissent’s narrow construction that would have limited the claims to the 
recited genes and plant cells only when in isolated laboratory form.  Id. at *24.  The 
majority concluded that “[w]hether or not patent protection for the gene and the cell 
extends to activities involving the plant is not relevant to the patent’s validity [but rather] 
relates only to the factual circumstances in which infringement will be found to have 
taken place . . . .”  Id. at *27.   
57 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 
125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005). 
58 The new economic learning of antitrust law teaches that ownership of a patent does not 
necessarily confer market power due to the possibility of consumers turning to 
noninfringing alternatives in the event of a price increase for the patented invention.  See, 
e.g. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 17, at § 5.3 (stating with respect to tying that the 
antitrust agencies “will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily 
confers market power upon its owner.”). 
59 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005). 
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V. Conclusion 
 
As a matter of patent law, the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
McFarling II is unremarkable.  The court has not shown a propensity to 
find patent owners guilty of patent misuse.60  But the Federal Circuit’s 
relatively summary dismissal of the antitrust challenges raised by 
McFarling bears further scrutiny.  A recognized “dissonance” exists at the 
intersection of the patent and antitrust laws,61 which has only been 
exacerbated by conflicts between the Federal Circuit’s patent and antitrust 
decisions and those of the regional circuits.62  McFarling II presented the 
Supreme Court with an attractive vehicle for imparting some much needed 
clarity at the intersection of these two increasingly intertwined legal 
regimes.  Although the Court declined to review McFarling II, the issues 
raised by the case are likely to recur with increasing frequency as 
Monsanto and other agribusiness giants continue their use of patents to 
control the growth and distribution of GM crops. 
 
60 See, e.g., CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000); C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Va. Panel Corp. v. 
MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-71 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
61 See Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(observing that “[a]t the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets 
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court.”). 
62 Compare id. at 1219 (holding that ownership of patents was presumptively valid reason 
for refusal to sell or license patented parts to independent repair services, but that 
presumption was rebuttable where patent ownership was mere pretext for masking 
anticompetitive behavior), with CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d at 1327 (explicitly rejecting Ninth 
Circuit’s “pretext” approach and refusing to inquire into a patent owner’s subjective 
motivations for refusing to license.).   
